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Notwithstanding a natural disaster of unprecedented
severity in the heart of the country, and at a time when
analysis of the underlying evidence and issues is more
detailed and comprehensive than ever before, there is doubt
that the nation will make fundamental changes necessary to
prevent a recurrence of the tragic flood losses of 1993.  The
Federal government has been struggling for at least 25 years
to put into action a coherent policy for floodplain
management.  It has never before had as solid a scientific
basis for shaping effective measures at federal, state, and
local levels.  The magnitude of the Midwest floods - albeit
now fading in public memory - still makes dramatic the
opportunity for improvements.  A few positive steps have
been taken.  The landmark report of the Interagency
Floodplain Management Review Committee pointed the was
to coherent reform, but the temptation to procrastinate is
large, and it is not clear that essential changes will be made.
In order to avoid a repetition of the 1993 tragedy in
the Mississippi Basin or in other regions the nation will have
to act positively on at least five major issues that have been
touched upon in the preceding papers.  First, the activities
and operating policies of more than ten Federal agencies
must be coordinated with each other and with the integrating
role on the ground of appropriate state agencies.  Second, the
present policies of providing Federal disaster relief will need
to be revised in a fashion consistent with the over-arching but
as yet inchoate aim of mitigation.  Third, government and
private insurance against flood losses must be offered in an
even more coherent fashion than authorized in the 1994
reform in the Federal insurance legislation.  Fourth, the
prosecution of Federal and cooperative programs for
management of the floodplains and associated watersheds of
the nation must be planned upon the basis of integrated
criteria and studies that take full account of the natural values
of wetlands and floodplains.  And last, none of these four
improvements can be achieved over time without a more
discerning and continuing executive and legislative audit of
how well policy directives are translated into action.
The Midwest Floods of 1993
Sharing the Challenge reports in detail of the
consequences of the large 1993 rainfall and subsequent
overflows of rivers in the Missouri and Upper Mississippi
basins.
At the time of the 1993 flood the prevailing
floodplain management policy, as it was practiced by Federal,
state, and local governments,  represented an evolution of
legislation and procedures over 120 years.  Heavy
investments had been made in control works and in plans for
further water development.  A flood insurance program was
available.  A variety of assessments had been conducted, and
showed that the unified national program for floodplain
management was neither national nor unified.  The nation's
vulnerability to floods had continued to climb.
The flood experience generated three important sets
of documents that proposed alterations in current government
procedures and policies.  Together, they marshalled a body of
critical analysis upon and around which the public debates on
policy improvements have been taking place.
First, the various environmental groups including
American Rivers, the National Wildlife Federation, and the
Association of State Wetlands Managers, contributed an
array of analyses and proposals that linked water control,
land use, soil, vegetation, wildlife, and water quality.
Second, during this period the Federal agencies
moved ahead with revision of their unified national program.
In so doing they were acutely aware of the emergency action
in 1993, and the proposals of the Special Administration
Floodplain Management Task Force, and published their
document after those recommendations had been released.  
Third, was the comprehensive examination of
experience and opportunities presented by the Interagency
Floodplain Management Review Committee.
Resistance to Change
Although Sharing the Challenge and the other analytical
studies were greeted with approval by some constituencies,
they are drawing severe criticism from other quarters.
Certain agricultural levee districts that had suffered
breaching were distressed at the prospect that dependent on
further studies, the levees might not be rebuilt at the previous
height or, preferably, to higher elevations.  Others applauded
the Corps of Engineers floodplain management assessment
that would postpone any action until its completion next year,
thereby leaving open an opportunity to bring in different
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recommendations.  Measures that would make it more
difficult to obtain disaster relief grants or loans to rebuild
damaged structures were opposed.  Communities that felt
they had been encouraged by past Federal protective works to
continue in vulnerable locations were reluctant to consider
relocation or readjustment in land use.  Other communities
interested in possible relocation were discouraged by the
cumbersome and tedious process of consulting with
numerous, separate federal agencies in order to take
advantage of available advice and funding.  These views were
reflected in Congressional caution at enacting any new
legislation beyond authorization of the assessment and
insurance reform.
Within Federal agencies, as well as some state
agencies, there is tacit or overt opposition to altering
administrative procedures as proposed under the unified,
national plan.  In most instances an agency exercises its basic
statutory responsibilities whose execution has to be modified
in certain degrees to take into account the reduction of
vulnerability to flood.  For example, the location and design
of public structures always has other primary purposes.
The disturbing prospect is that another year or two
will pass without achieving fundamental improvements in
process and policy toward floodplain management.   Without
such alterations, the studies, review, and public discussion of
recent years will turn out to be largely fruitless.  To avoid
that outcome, change must be achieved in five, inter-related,
directions.  All should contribute to nourishing wise use of
floodplains for the foreseeable future.  This will not mean the
same protection or the same land use of all floodplains.  It
will come from a process that promotes careful judgment for
each sector of a floodplain of what may be its more
productive social use in the long run.  In some sectors the use
will be highly intensive and highly protected.  At the other
extreme, in some sectors it will be leaving the soil and
vegetation and water in their natural condition.  Most lands
will be in gradations between those extremes, and local
communities will need to work out the suitable combinations.
Long-term Policy Issues
1.  Federal-State Coordination
The record of performance as shown in the 1992
Assessment suggests at least two major conditions for
achieving an enlightened coordination.  First, to be effective,
the collaboration among Federal agencies must be mandated
by the Congress and vigorously enforced by the Executive
Office.   Second, the states or some other agent must be in a
position to assist positively if the Federal policies are to be
interpreted and used constructively at the scale of counties
and municipalities.
Each one of the interested Federal agencies has its
basic authorizations and operating procedures most of which
are initially independent of floodplain matters.  This is the
case, for example, with transportation improvements.  Unless
the Congress in statutes clearly directs the agencies to
conform their future activities to a well-defined national
floodplain policy they will find it difficult to pursue the
programs specified by the Review Committee or by the
unified national plan.  The effect of such hortatory
declarations may be modest at best unless the Executive
Office supervision is sustained and unless the Congress
supports them with authorizations for appropriate agency
activity and funding.
At the same time, it is naive to expect that the
federal agencies with the best of intentions and under some
central guidance will be able to make their information,
advice, and funding suitably available at the local level unless
there is coordination in the field by an appropriate state
agency.  Even if a local community were completely unified
in wanting to move out of the floodplain to a safer location or
in desiring to convert cultivated fields into wetland reserves
it would have great difficulty in doing so unless it
understands all possibly helpful Federal programs and how
to deal suitably with each of them.  It became evident during
1993 that for many local communities with such intentions
the assistance of a well-informed and well-staffed state
agency was crucial.  The strength of such agencies differs
greatly from state to state, and means must be found to assure
their adequate support.
2.  Coherent Disaster Relief and Mitigation Policy
It was demonstrated once again in 1993 that if the
policy for granting relief or for making recovery loans does
not directly encourage mitigation by the disaster victims there
is no assurance that the next extreme event will not provoke
a repetition of similar distress.  While it does not yet have a
coherent program to complement its program for emergency
response, FEMA currently is revising its basic national policy
so as to emphasize mitigation.  Previously, the owner of
damaged property receiving assistance may lack incentive to
repair or rebuild so as to reduce vulnerability.  In 1994
FEMA has held a series of "town meetings" in each of its
regions to explore how the people affected may be
encouraged and assisted to use land, design buildings, and
schedule activities so as to minimize losses when the next
extreme event occurs.  At present, only a part of the
emergency assistance or planning has the effect of reducing
loss vulnerability in the long term.  Relocation and
retrofitting are principal tools, and studies are needed to
determine how they may be better promoted.  Political bodies
find it difficult to design preventive measures at times when
the human suffering is most acute and immediate, and they
need not only to take mitigating steps in advance of a
disaster, but be prepared to move effectively in its wake.
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3. Revised Flood Insurance Criteria and Premiums
A few of the sobering facts about the role of Federal
flood insurance in the 1993 floods indicate the complexity of
putting into effect an improved program.  Only about 10
percent of the damaged households carried flood insurance,
with the proportion differing from 5 to 50 percent among
flooded areas.  Many buildings for which mortgages are
provided by federally supervised, regulated or insured lenders
did not carry flood insurance although it is federal policy to
require such coverage.  Many of the properties paying for
insurance were in areas suffering chiefly from high ground
water and sewer back-ups.  A substantial proportion of
properties covered were those located outside of zones where
land-use and building regulations are enforced.  Many
property owners behind levees that cannot protect against
major floods do not carry insurance or, if they are insured, do
not pay actuarial rates.   The premium schedules do not
encourage purchasers to adopt mitigation measures.  In 1993
a large number of floodplain dwellers waited until a few days
after flooding was forecast before purchasing flood insurance,
and thus did not pay premiums for other years.  The
operation of the Community Rating System to determine the
suitability of a community to qualify for purchase of federal
insurance by its citizens has addressed local conformity to
some land use and structured regulations but has not
addressed some of these problems adequately.
The congressional reform of the national flood
insurance authorizations in August 1994 sought to correct
certain of these deficiencies, such as lender compliance, but
much more needs to be done in setting rates and in
encouraging mitigation if insurance is to truly promote loss
mitigation and wise use, rather than be solely a means of
sharing the burden of property losses.
4.  Recognition of Natural Floodplain and Watershed Values
While much has been said about the importance of
preserving natural values in floodplain management, there
have been few concrete demonstrations of how this can be
accomplished on the ground.  Over the years the concept of
sound use of floodplains has been expanded and specified to
recognize that it is not in the sustained public interest to use
a valley area so that its natural resources are depleted or to
cause degradation of the resource in other areas downstream
or upstream.  The criteria for judging the costs and benefits
of floodplain use need to take accurate account of these
resource effects as well as conventional property damages.
By that view the social judgment of floodplain management
goes beyond estimating prospective benefits from and costs
of using the land.  It embraces the range of values for soil,
vegetation, water, wildlife, and recreation in that landscape
and in affected landscapes elsewhere in the same drainage
area.
Notwithstanding earnest activities of the Soil
Conservation Service and a variety of farm, soil, wildlife, and
recreational agencies at federal, state, and local levels, means
by which the general goals can be reached are in a formative
stage in some drainage areas and river reaches.  Programs for
wetlands preservation and restoration, for example, are not
well integrated with agricultural support programs or with
emerging ecosystem management efforts.  The challenge is
to assure that the importance of the search is recognized
without on one hand being so general or so complicated and
time consuming that little is accomplished, or on the other
hand settling on a few simple techniques, and discouraging
further experimentation.
5.  Incisive Post-audits
One of the sad features of the history of floodplain
management since 1968 is that while thoughtful and
probably positive proposals were made for improvement, a
number of them were carried out only in part, and that there
was pitifully little effort at either the Congressional or
executive level to keep track of what actually happened as a
consequence on the nation's floodplains and why there was
miscarriage of good intentions.  The record already noted of
the insurance coverage for the 1993 flood damages is an
example.  The response to the proclamation of the Executive
Orders of 1966 and 1977, directing Federal agencies to take
account  of flood hazard in their activities, such as in locating
new buildings, is another.  The unwillingness of the
Executive Office at that time to give serious consideration to
the recommendations of the Interagency Task Force's 1992
assessment report is a further instance of failure to find out
why the weaknesses noted in that report were not being
remedied.
A Critical Choice
As the situation appears to stand more than a year
after the great flood of 1993 subsided, the nation responded
to relief needs with alacrity and with a limited willingness to
innovate in the path of destruction.  In addition, the Congress
authorized a few changes in flood insurance procedures, and
the executive branch has completed major appraisal of the
situation and possible remedies, and has an engineering
assessment under way.  The opportunities to carry out
fundamental improvements in executive administration and
in basic water and land management policy have been
presented.  As a minimum, they would require basic changes
in Federal and state executive management, and in policies
guiding disaster relief, flood insurance, the natural values of
wetlands and floodplains, and the use of post audits.
If those or similar measures are not taken, the
country can go on substantially as it has in recent decades in
responding to flood whenever that occurs, and in doing very
little to prevent the magnitude of the next flood disaster in
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the Midwest or in other parts of the country from being larger
than before for similar floods.  As memory of the 1993 event
dims and as government agencies resist major changes in
procedures, there will be short-term rewards from
procrastination.  Agencies will avoid the trouble of making
radical changes in their operations.  Recipients of subsidized
assistance will expect a continuation of that support without
being obliged to consider mitigation aims.  There may be
adopted a variety of partial measures yielding some long-term
benefits, but until major steps are taken to face up to all of the
five outstanding issues of policy, the next great flood seems
likely to cause as much distress as did last year's, and there
will be fur ther delay in attaining socially and
environmentally sound use of the nation's floodplains.
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